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ABSTRACT  
The increasing role of credit rating agencies in emerging markets and the various impacts that these rating agencies 
have on emerging market economies have become of great interest in modern finance. Recent empirical evidence 
suggests that credit rating downgrades have the potential to disrupt economies. To minimise and control such 
disruption, it is essential to establish what exactly these disruptions entitles. This study aims to determine whether a 
South African sovereign credit rating downgrade caused abnormal returns in the shares of local retail banks. 
Furthermore, the study sets out to determine whether A South African sovereign credit rating downgrade resulted in 
significant volatility spillover on the shares of South African retail banks. An event study analysis will be implemented 
to determine whether a downgrade caused abnormal returns, and the presence of volatility spillovers will be 
determined by means of a GARCH-BEKK model. The main findings indicates that a South African sovereign credit 
downgrade did result in negative cumulated abnormal returns, and that a change in the South African sovereign credit 
rating did cause volatility in the shares of South African retail banks. These share price effects can have various 
implications, such as spillovers to other parts of the equity market, as well as negative spillovers to the real economy. 
In order to mitigate the potential implications of a South African sovereign credit rating change through the South 
African retail banking sector, the effects of such a change must first be determined, making this an important study to 
conduct.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The presence of rating agencies in developing countries has increased dramatically in the past two decades, and the 
importance of credit rating agencies in emerging markets, as well as their potential to cause extreme volatility and 
economic disruption in these markets have been a major topic of debate and research. Sovereign credit ratings are 
seen by investors as a good measurement of the political, economic and financial state of a country, and therefore 
largely determine the extent of foreign investment and the required rate of return on those investments in a country 
(Orhan & Yusuf, 2014). Williams et al. (2015) therefore states that sovereign and corporate credit ratings improve the 
capacity of a country’s public and private sector to attain foreign capital in various forms.  
Accordingly, Williams et al. (2015) writes that rating agencies have a critical role to play in developing countries, as 
they can reduce the information asymmetries between developed countries and developing ones. Investment 
opportunities in developing countries typically carry high risk and low information quality relative to investment 
opportunities in developed markets (Williams et al., 2015). Foreign investors therefore depend heavily on sovereign 
credit rating agencies to provide information on the risk and, by implication, the required return levels of investment 
opportunities in developing economies. This information bridge created by rating agencies allows both public and 
private entities in developing countries to attract foreign capital. It is widely believed that an increase in foreign 
investments and loanable funds will speed up development in emerging markets, and in so doing, create a range of 
economic benefits (Bumann, Hermes & Lensink, 2013).   
Despite the important role credit rating agencies play in attracting foreign capital, credit rating agencies have received 
great criticism and blame in recent years for causing major disruptions and distortions in emerging economies. 
Vernazza and Nielsen (2015), Vaaler and McNamara (2004) and Shen, Huang and Hasan (2012) argue that the rating 
process implemented by credit rating agencies when rating sovereign credit is particularly harsh on emerging market 
sovereign credit and found that the process tends to be negatively biased towards emerging markets. Furthermore, 
Vernazza and Nielsen (2015) states that credit rating agencies should adapt their rating methodology when rating the 
debt of sovereigns in emerging markets, because the dynamics in these markets are significantly different than that of 
developed countries. However, sovereign credit rating agencies typically falter to do so, and can cause major 
disruption in smaller economies that actually perform fairly well. This has proven to especially be the case in the local 
banking sector of an economy (Correa, Lee, Sapriza and Suarez, 2014).  
The 2007/2008 financial crisis has provided evidence that investors very closely relate the banking sector of an 
economy to the performance of the local government. One of the prominent reasons found by Correa et al. (2014) for 
this relationship is that investors expect government to bail out poorly performing banks. Consequently, banks that 
are known to be heavily dependent on the financial support of their government, and that depend on their government 
to bail them out in a case of bankruptcy, will be affected more severely than others in the case of a sovereign credit 
downgrade. Furthermore, banks are extremely sensitive to interest rate fluctuations, given the natural duration 
mismatch between assets and liabilities (Fabozzi, 2007). Therefore, because of the sovereign ceiling phenomena 
typically restricts the credit rating of banks to the sovereign credit rating, a sovereign credit rating change will likely 
affect the prevailing market interest rates, as well as the cost to raise their own capital (Correa et al., 2014).  
Correa et al. (2014) considered the share price of banks worldwide, and established that sovereign credit downgrades 
have a greatly negative effect on the share returns of these banks. Williams et al. (2015) supports Correa et al. (2014), 
finding that the cumulative abnormal returns of local emerging market banks are 4.67% on average after a sovereign 
credit rating downgrade by S&P. Almeida et al., (2017) found evidence that a sovereign credit rating downgrade 
typically caused the fundamentals of banks to deteriorate over a length of time. Other researchers such as Borensztein 
et al. (2013), Kim and Wu (2012), Brooks, Faff, Hillier and Hillier (2004) and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) found 
similar results.  
Given the evidence found by these researchers, a sovereign credit rating downgrade typically have a negative impact 
on the banking sector of an economy. This in combination with the findings that sovereign credit rating changes have 
amplified effects on emerging markets render it is essential to know what the impact of a sovereign credit rating 
change is on the local banking sector of emerging markets. This will afford policy makers, and market participants a 
better idea of how to manage any such effects. Given the recent political instability and considerable amount of 
sovereign credit rating downgrades South Africa experienced over the past decade, it is essential for policy makers 
and market participants to know how to mitigate any negative effects resulting from future sovereign credit rating 
downgrades.  
However, even though empirical findings by other researchers suggest that these rating downgrades are likely to have 
a negative impact on the South African retail banks, the South African banking industry is argued to be exceptionally 
well developed as well as very robust and sound compared to the banking industry of most other emerging markets, 
and that it can compete with that of developed countries (IMF, 2014 and Mlambo & Ncube, 2011). Therefore, even 
though South Africa is an emerging economy, the results might differ to that of other research done in emerging 
markets regarding this matter. It is thereto necessary to first determine what the typical impact of a South African 
credit rating change is on the shares of South African retail banks, in order to develop and use tools to manage such 
effects. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section two describe the data as well as the methods used 
in this paper. The empirical results will then be depicted in section four, and finally, the last section will provide a 
conclusion.  
2. DATA AND METHOD 
The study will be based on the largest four South African retail banks as measured by total market capitalisation, 
determined by the latest financial statements of each bank.  The four largest South African retail banks as measured 
by market capitalisation is: Standard Bank; FirstRand, which is the holding company of First National Bank (FNB); 
ABSA and Nedbank Group. These four retail banks have a total South African market share of approximately 83.2 
percent, and are therefore often argued in literature to be a good sample for South African retail banks (Baker, 2015).  
2.1 DATA DESCRIPTION  
This study will specifically focus on the three most recent South African sovereign credit rating downgrades by the 
S&P credit rating agency. Firstly, an event study analysis will be conducted to determine whether a South African 
sovereign credit rating downgrade caused any abnormal returns in the share prices of South African retail bank. The 
data for this section will also be collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon and Thomson Reuters DataStream. Variables 
to be included in the event study is the share price of each bank, as well as the South African All share index as a 
market proxy. The daily returns of each variable will be calculated. The sample for this analysis will range from 05 
April 2012 to 15 April 2017. According to Lakshmi and Joshi (2016) as well as Makiono (2016), an event study 
typically consists of three distinct time periods, and these three time periods needs to be identified before the study 
could commence. In this case there are three South African downgrades, and therefore three events. Table 1 depicts 
the time periods for each event.  
Table 1: Event study time frames 
Event day 12 October 2012  13 June 2014 03 April 2017 
Estimation period 05 April 2012 to 27 
September 2012 
05 December   2013 
to 29 May 2014 
23 September 2016 to 
17 May 2017 
Event window 28 September 2012 to 
26 October 2012 
30 May 2014 to 27 
June 2014 
20 Mar 2017 to 15 
April 2017 
Source: Standard & Poor (2017)  
Secondly, the volatility spillover effect of a South African sovereign credit rating downgrade on the share price return 
of each respective bank will be determine. Data will be sourced from Thomson Reuters Eikon and Thomson Reuters 
DataStream. Daily share price returns for each bank and the daily change in the South African five-year credit default 
swap (CDS) from 22 June 2007 to 23 June 2017 will be used. As stated by Mohammadi and Tan (2015), the data used 
to estimate a GARCH-BEKK model needs to be high frequency data, for example daily data. Since sovereign credit 
ratings do not change on a daily basis, a change in the South African five-year CDS’s will be used as a proxy for the 
South African sovereign credit rating change. CDS data is available on a daily basis and according to Fabozzi (2007), 
the CDS on a debt instrument and the change thereto provides a good representation of the change in the perceived 
creditworthiness of that asset.  
2.2 EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY  
The market model will be used to calculate expected returns, and are specified as follows, in accordance with Lakshmi 
and Joshi (2016), Makiono (2016) and Nading (2015): 
ܴ௘௥௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ 	ߚ௜ܴ௠௧ ൅	ߝ௜௧                                                                                                                              (1)                                            
Where: 
ܴ௘௥௧ = expected return at time t 
ߙ௜ = the intercept, thus, the average fluctuation in the return of a share not driven by market fluctuations 
ܴ௠௧ = market return 
	ߚ௜ = sensitivity of bank share returns to fluctuations in the South African All Share Index. 
The actual return of each time series will be calculated as follows:  
ܴ௔௧ ൌ ሺܣ௧ െ ܣ௧ିଵሻ/ܣ௧ିଵ                                                                                                                                 (2) 
Where: 
ܴ௔௧=return on asset at time t 
ܣ௧= price of the asset at time t 
ܣ௧ିଵ=price of the asset one period before 
Based on the estimated expected return the abnormal return will be calculated. This will be done by deducting the 
actual market return realised by each bank during the period of analysis from the expected return. This could be 
expressed as follows:  
ܴ௔	ୀ	ܴ௥ െ ܴ௘                                                                                                                                                     (3) 
Where 
ܴ௔		= Abnormal return  
ܴ௘	= Expected return 
ܴ௥ = Realised return 
To determine the total effect of a South African sovereign credit rating downgrade on the South African retail banks 
over, the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each bank will calculated by means of adding all the  abnormal 
returns of each respective day in the event window up (Lakshmi & Joshi, 2016). This will allow one to establish the 
total effect of a South African sovereign credit rating downgrade, and not merely its effect on each respective day. 
After determining whether a South African sovereign credit rating downgrade cause any negative abnormal returns in 
the shares of South African retail banks it should be determined whether a South African sovereign credit rating 
downgrade caused any volatility spillovers to the shares of the banks under analysis.  The second part of the analysis 
will be conducted by means of estimating a GARCH-BEKK model 
2.3 GARCH-BEKK METHODOLOGY  
The GARCH-BEKK model could be structured with various lag structures, however, the GARCH(1,1)-BEKK model 
is by far the most commonly used in literature. Liu, An, Huang, and Wen, (2017) argue that a GARCH(1,1)-BEKK 
model is sufficient to estimate volatility spillovers between two time series. The GARCH(1,1)-BEKK model indicate 
that one lagged squared residual and one lagged variance of the residual are included in the model. Liu et al. (2017) 
and Mohammadi and Tan (2015) specify the mean equation of the multivariate GARCH(1,1)-BEKK model adopted 
in this study as follows:  
ܴ௧ሺ݅ሻ ൌ 	 ൤ܴௌ௉,௧ሺ݅ሻ 0ܴ஼ோ,௧ሺ݅ሻ 0൨ + ൤
ߝௌ௉,௧ሺ݅ሻ 0
ߝ஼ோ,௧ሺ݅ሻ 0൨                                                                                                             (4)                                        
Where: 
ܴ௧ሺ݅ሻ = a (2 x 1) vector of share price return and a change in the South African sovereign credit rating at time t.  
According to Liu et al. (2017) and Mohammadi and Tan (2015), the variance equation of the multivariate 
GARCH(1,1)-BEKK model adopted in this study is specified as follows:  
ܪ௧ሺ݅ሻ ൌ ܥᇱܥ ൅ ܣ′ఢ೟షభሺ௜ሻఢᇲ೟షభሺ݅ሻܣ ൅ ܤᇱܪ௧ିଵሺ݅ሻܤ                                                                                               (5)  
Where: 
ܪ௧ሺ݅ሻ = a (2 × 2) vector representing the conditional variance matrix at scale i 
ܥ = a constant coefficient matrix 
ܣ= the coefficient of conditional residual matrix, and  
ܤ = the coefficient of conditional covariance matrix.  
Expressed in matrix terms as: 
 
A =	ቂܽଵଵ ܽଵଶܽଶଵ ܽଶଶቃ	, B =	൤
ܾଵଵ ܾଵଶ
ܾଶଵ ܾଶଶ൨ and C = ൤
ܿଵଵ 0ܿଶଵ ܿଶଶ൨ 
 
The main condition for volatility models is that the data must be stationary (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). Before 
conducting the GARCH(1,1)-BEKK this condition must be met.  An Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test will be 
conducted as a formal test to determine whether the time series of the return of each variable is stationary preliminary 
to conducting any volatility model. If the variables under analysis are found to be stationary, each variable to be 
included in the GARCH-BEKK model will first be tested for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) 
effects before estimating the formal GARCH(1,1)-BEKK model (Liu et al., 2017). This will be done to discern whether 
volatility clusters exist in the returns of each bank’s share price and the change in the South African sovereign credit 
rating.  Liu et al. (2017) argue that the GARCH-BEKK model should only be conducted if all the variables included 
in the model contain volatility clusters.  
   
With the GARCH(1,1)-BEKK model, the conditional variance of the share return of each bank could be deconstructed 
into its ARCH and GARCH constituents. For example, the A(scrd ,n) shows how the ARCH volatility of Nedbank 
share returns depends on the shocks on the South African sovereign credit rating (Liu et al., 2017). Furthermore, 
B(scrd, n) shows how the GARCH volatility of Nedbank shares also depends on the shocks in the South African 
sovereign credit rating. The significance of the coefficient of conditional residual matrix and the coefficient of 
conditional covariance matrix will be tested to determine whether there are significant volatility spillovers between a 
change in the South African sovereign credit rating and the share price of each bank under analysis. In accordance 
with Liu et al. (2017) and Mohammadi and Tan (2015), if the coefficient of conditional residual matrix and the 
coefficient of conditional covariance matrix are significant then a change in the South African sovereign credit rating 
had a volatility spillover to both the ARCH and GARCH terms of each share price under analysis. The results obtained 
by implementing the above mentioned methodology will now be considered.    
 
3. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
This section will commence with the event study as a means to determine whether a South African sovereign credit 
rating downgrade caused any abnormal returns in the share price of South African retail banks. Thereafter the 
GARCH-BEKK (1,1) model will be estimated to determine whether a South African sovereign credit rating 
downgrade caused any volatility spillovers in the shares of South African retail banks. 
 
3.1. EVENS STUDY ANALYSIS 
Firstly, it is necessary to estimate the market model as the share price returns of the respective banks under analysis 
will be measured relative to the market returns. The market model will produce the necessary coefficients to do so.  
3.1.1. ESTIMATING THE MARKET MODEL 
In this model the return on each bank’s share price will be the dependent variable and the return on the JSE All Share 
Index will be the explanatory variable.  The significance of the cumulative abnormal returns will also be considered. 
Table 2 represents the coefficients of each bank’s market model based on the estimation window prior to each Standard 
& Poor’s South African sovereign credit rating downgrade respectively. 
Table 2: Market model outputs 
 Nedbank FNB Standard 
Bank 
Absa 
 12 October 2012 
	ߚ௜ 0.963 -0.132 -0.161 -0.245 
ߙ௜ 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
ߝ௜௧ 0.092 0.111 0.105 0.114 
 13 June 2014 
	ߚ௜ 1.172 -0.187 -0.173 -0.106 
ߙ௜ 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
ߝ௜௧ 0.105 0.134 0.125 0.146 
 03 April 2017 
	ߚ௜ 1.023 -0.206 -0.102 0.043 
ߙ௜ 0.00 0.002 0.002 0.001 
ߝ௜௧ 0.178 0.164 0.196 0.173 
Source: Eviews estimates  
The coefficients in Table 2 will be substituted into the market model in order to estimate expected returns for each 
bank under analysis. The expected returns for each downgrade calculated by the market model are listed in the 
appendix from table 1 to 3. The potential abnormal returns caused by South African sovereign credit rating 
downgrades by S&P will now be considered.  
3.1.2. ABNORMAL RETURNS 
The first window is the South African sovereign credit rating downgrade by S&P on the 12th of October 2012 and this 
window will now be considered.  
3.1.2.1. S&P 12th of October 2012 downgrade 
Consider Tables 3 and 4, depicting abnormal returns caused by a South African sovereign credit rating downgrade by 
S&P on the 12th of October 2012. Nedbank experienced four days of significant returns within the event window. Two 
of these significant abnormal returns occurred within the 10 days prior to the South African sovereign credit rating 
downgrade and both abnormal returns were negative. The other two significant abnormal returns occurred within the 
10 days after the South African sovereign credit rating downgrade by S&P. One of these significant abnormal returns 
was positive and one negative. The biggest abnormal return prior to the downgrade was negative - 5.87% at a 99% 
confidence level, and occurred 10 days prior to the downgrade. The biggest abnormal return after the downgrade was 
negative - 1.72% at a 90% confidence level and occurred six days after the downgrade. Note that the abnormal return 
on the event day was insignificant. 
Table 3: Bank abnormal returns prior to a South African sovereign downgrade (12th of October 2012) 
 Bank 
Day Ned FNB Std ABSA 
-10 -5.87%*** 
(-6.473) 
0.10% 
(0.092) 
0.27% 
(0.27) 
0.34% 
(0.392) 
-9 0.69% -0.09% -0.11% 0.56% 
(0.761) (-0.087) (-0.082) (0.527) 
-8 0.48% 
(0.523) 
0.30% 
(0.267) 
0.24% 
(0.173) 
0.14% 
(0.126) 
-7 1.158% 
(1.261) 
1.11% 
(0.964)
-1.11% 
(-0.832)
-0.27% 
(-0.265)
-6 -0.21% 
(-0.237) 
0.56% 
(0.488) 
-0.42% 
(-0.326) 
1.67% 
(1.574) 
-5 1.47% 
(1.612) 
-3.66%*** 
(-3.187) 
-0.85% 
(-0.645) 
-2.52%** 
(-2.375) 
-4 -1.77%** 
(-2.013) 
-5.39%*** 
(-4.694) 
-2.03%* 
(-1.669) 
-0.49% 
(-0.469) 
-3 -0.19% 
(-0.217) 
0.52% 
(0.458) 
-0.05% 
(-0.044) 
1.22% 
(1.145) 
-2 0.25% 
(0.275) 
0.35% 
(0.315) 
1.12% 
(0.846) 
-2.62%** 
(-2.464) 
-1 -0.03% 
(-0.033) 
0.98% 
(0.852) 
1.21% 
(0.916) 
0.89% 
(0.847) 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on the t-statistic 
Source: Excel outputs 
Table 4: Bank abnormal returns on the day of a South African sovereign downgrade and the abnormal 
returns thereafter (12th of October 2012) 
 Bank 
Day Ned FNB Std ABSA 
Day of 
downgrade 
-1.11% 
(-1.235) 
0.84% 
(0.738) 
-0.39% 
(-0.391) 
0.86% 
(0.813) 
1 1.53%* 
(1.721)
-0.09% 
(-0.074) 
0.56% 
(0.425)
-0.13% 
(-0.113)
2 -0.63% 
(-0.693) 
0.45% 
(0.365) 
0.48% 
(0.367) 
0.69% 
(0.647) 
3 0.96% 
(1.065)
1.26% 
(1.094) 
0.51% 
(0.386)
0.12% 
(0.111)
4 -0.42% 
(-0.468) 
-1.73% 
(-1.514) 
-1.59% 
(-1.23) 
-0.62% 
(-0.574) 
5 0.49% 
(0.525) 
-1.90%* 
(-1.665) 
-0.13% 
(-0.095) 
-0.30% 
(-0.287) 
6 0.66% 
(0.738) 
2.53%** 
(2.221) 
0.81% 
(0.604) 
-1.05% 
(-0.990) 
7 -1.73%* 
(-1.924) 
0.39% 
(0.334) 
-0.52% 
(-0.384) 
0.03% 
(0.011) 
8 -1.26% 
(-1.389) 
1.08% 
(0.954) 
0.77% 
(0.584) 
-0.17% 
(-0.165) 
9 -1.02% 
(-1.129) 
0.22% 
(0.195) 
0.47% 
(0.366) 
-0.30% 
(-0.275) 
10 1.38% 
(1.514) 
-0.48% 
(-0.148) 
-0.28% 
(-0.244) 
0.04% 
(0.031) 
CAR -4.39%*** 
(-7.652) 
-4.76%*** 
(-8.234) 
-3.38%*** 
(-6.433) 
-1.91%* 
(1.726) 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on p-value 
Source: Excel output 
FNB experienced four days of abnormal returns within the event window. Two of these significant abnormal returns 
occurred within the 10 days prior to the South African sovereign credit rating downgrade and both abnormal returns 
were negative. The other two significant abnormal returns occurred within the 10 days after the South African 
sovereign credit rating downgrade by S&P. Two of these significant abnormal returns occurred within the 10 days 
prior to the South African sovereign credit rating downgrade and both abnormal returns were negative. After the event 
day, one significant positive and one significant negative abnormal return were found.  
This downgrade resulted in one day of significant negative abnormal returns for Standard Bank and ABSA. For both 
these banks, the significant abnormal return transpired before the event day and was negative; 2.02% and 2.62% 
respectively. These results speak to the individual days within the event window, however, these results do not speak 
to the aggregate effect of a South African sovereign credit rating downgrade on the share price of each retail bank 
under analysis during the event window. A consideration of the aggregate effect of a South African sovereign credit 
rating downgrade on the retail banks under analysis during the event window will be done by considering the 
cumulative abnormal returns of each bank during that period.  
The cumulative abnormal returns for Nedbank, FNB, Standard Bank and ABSA are -4.39%, -4.76%, -3.38%, -1.91% 
respectively. All of these cumulative returns are significant at a 99% confidence interval. The second window under 
consideration is the South African sovereign credit rating downgrade by S&P on the 13th of June 2014.   
3.1.2.2. S&P 13th of June 2014 downgrade 
Consider Tables 5 and 6, depicting abnormal returns resulting from a South African sovereign credit rating downgrade 
by S&P on the 13th of June 2014. Nedbank experienced three days of significant returns within the event window. 
Two of these significant abnormal returns occurred within the 10 days prior to the South-African sovereign credit 
rating downgrade. One of these abnormal returns was negative and the other was positive. On the day of the South 
African sovereign credit rating downgrade the Nedbank share price experienced a negative abnormal return that was 
significant at a 95% confidence level.  
Table 5: Bank abnormal returns prior to a South African sovereign downgrade (13th of June 2014) 
 Bank 
Day Ned FNB Std Absa 
-10 -2.65%** 
(-2.262) 
0.54% 
(0.322) 
-0.73% 
(-0.611)
0.42% 
(0.401)
-9 1.0% 
(0.734) 
-1.83% 
(-1.546) 
-0.61% 
(-0.542) 
-0.34% 
(-0.327) 
-8 -0.8% 
(-0.602) 
-0.92% 
(-0.834) 
-0.91% 
(-0.751) 
0.15% 
(0.142) 
-7 -0.34% 
(-0.266) 
-0.44% 
(-0.259) 
1.00% 
(0.837) 
0.29% 
(0.275) 
-6 0.31% 
(0.245) 
-0.39% 
(-0.227) 
1.53% 
(1.253) 
0.23% 
(0.255) 
-5 3.0%** 
(2.282) 
-1.02% 
(-0.942) 
1.30% 
(1.055) 
0.11% 
(0.153) 
-4 -0.94% 
(-0.657) 
-1.65% 
(-1.135) 
-0.8% 
(-0.661)
-0.21% 
(-0.197)
-3 0.37% 
(0.212) 
-1.8% 
(-1.476) 
0.34% 
(0.287) 
-0.06% 
(-0.050) 
-2 -1.22% 
(-1.076) 
0.97% 
(0.892) 
-0.51% 
(-0.424) 
0.89% 
(0.848) 
-1 1.82% 
(1.584) 
-0.28% 
(-0.166) 
0.04% 
(0.035) 
-0.71% 
(-0.670) 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on p-value 
Source: Excel Output  
Table 6: Bank abnormal returns on the day of a South African sovereign downgrade and the abnormal returns 
thereafter (13th of June 2014) 
 Bank 
Day Ned FNB Std Absa 
Day of downgrade -2.19%** 
(-2.069) 
-2.54%** 
(-2.164) 
-0.46% 
(-0.371) 
0.68% 
(0.637) 
1 0.0% 
(0.001) 
0.33% 
(0.198) 
0.0% 
(0.000) 
0.05% 
(0.468) 
2 0.7% 
(0.544) 
0.34% 
(0.191) 
-0.84% 
(-0.684) 
-0.03% 
(-0.29) 
3 -0.2% 
(-0.144) 
0.26% 
(0.154) 
-0.82% 
(-0.665) 
-0.94% 
(-0.881) 
4 -1.1% 
(-0.896) 
-6.28%*** 
(-9.353)
0.78% 
(0.643)
0.04% 
(0.033)
5 1.3% -8.6%*** -0.71% 0.16%
(1.029) (-4.946) (-0.582) (0.154) 
6 0.2% 
(0.154) 
12.51%*** 
(7.174) 
1.1% 
(0.917) 
0.1% 
(0.099) 
7 -0.6% 
(-0.456) 
4.59%** 
(2.636)
0.33% 
(0.273)
0.45% 
(0.425)
8 -1.87% 
(-1.592) 
0.42% 
(0.248) 
-0.25% 
(-0.212) 
-0.37% 
(-0.356) 
9 0.2% 
(0.138) 
0.29 
(0.177) 
-1.93%* 
(-1.764) 
0.35% 
(0.332) 
10 0.5% 
(0.361) 
-1.9% 
(-1.612) 
-0.4% 
(-0.331) 
-0.29% 
(-0.273) 
CAR -1.28%*** 
(-3.813) 
-7.14%*** 
(-2.714) 
-
2.5%*** 
(-8.124) 
0.74% 
(1.56) 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on p-value 
Source: Excel Output 
In the case of FNB, five days within the event window proved to render abnormal returns. No abnormal returns 
occurred prior to the South African sovereign credit rating downgrade, however, FNB shares experienced significant 
negative abnormal returns on the day of the downgrade and four more significant abnormal returns, two of which 
were negative and two positive.   
Standard Bank experienced one day of significant abnormal returns within the event window. This abnormal return 
was negative (1.93%) and significant at a 90% confidence level. Note that ABSA did not experience any significant 
abnormal returns during the event window. 
The cumulative abnormal returns were -1.28%, -7.14%, -2.5% and 0.74% for Nedbank, FNB, Standard Bank and 
ABSA respectively. The cumulative abnormal returns for Nedbank, FNB and Standard Bank were all significant at a 
99% confidence level; conversely, the cumulative abnormal returns for ABSA were not significant. The third window 
is the South African sovereign credit rating downgrade by S&P on the 3rd of April 2017. 
3.1.2.3. S&P 3rd April 2017 downgrade 
Consider Table 7 and 8, depicting abnormal returns resulting from a South African sovereign credit rating downgrade 
by S&P on the 3rd April 2017. Nedbank experienced five days of significant returns within the event window. Two of 
these significant abnormal returns occurred within the 10 days prior to the South African sovereign credit rating 
downgrade.  Both significant abnormal returns during the 10 days prior to the downgrade were negative. On the day 
of the South African sovereign credit rating downgrade the Nedbank share price experienced a negative abnormal 
return of 5.79% and was significant at a 99% confidence level. Two days within the 10 days subsequent to the South 
African sovereign credit rating downgrade proved to render significant negative abnormal returns.  
Table 7: Bank abnormal returns prior to a South African sovereign downgrade (3rd of April 2017) 
 Standard & Poor (2017) downgrade 
Day NED FNB STD 
 
ABSA 
-10 0.57% 
(-1.102) 
0.15% 
(0.084) 
0.51% 
(0.270) 
0.67% 
(0.346)  
-9 -0.60% 
(-0.42) 
0.01% 
(0.000) 
1.29% 
(0.704) 
0.23% 
(0.117) 
-8 -0.90% 
(-0.635) 
-1.76% 
(-0.986) 
0.64% 
(0.343) 
-3.12%* 
(-1.661) 
-7 -0.68% 
(-0.487) 
1.23% 
(0.689) 
-1.27% 
(-0.697) 
0.74% 
(0.395)  
-6 -0.44% 
(-0.316) 
2.76%* 
(1.912) 
2.12% 
(1.155) 
3.72%* 
(1.946)  
-5 -1.05% 
(-0.736) 
1.52% 
(0.858) 
2.17% 
(1.186) 
1.33% 
(0.695)  
-4 -
2.04%** 
(-2.144) 
-1.02% 
(-0.569) 
-0.55% 
(-0.293) 
1.40% 
(0.734)  
-3 -1.31%* 
(-1.660) 
-0.80% 
(-0.441) 
-0.66% 
(-0.366) 
-0.56% 
(-0.291)  
-2 -0.61% 
(-0.434) 
-0.89% 
(-0.492) 
2.05% 
(1.114) 
0.91% 
(0.473)  
-1 0.54% 
(0.386) 
1.18% 
(0.654) 
-0.60% 
(-0.335) 
-0.66% 
(-0.344)  
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on p-value 
Source: Excel Output 
Table 8: Bank abnormal returns on the day of a South African sovereign downgrade and the abnormal returns 
thereafter (3rd of April 2017) 
Day NED FNB STD ABSA 
Day of downgrade -5.79%*** 
(-4.485) 
-2.12%* 
(-1.694) 
-0.93% 
(-0.517) 
-0.12% 
(-0.067)  
1 -2.71%*** 
(-2.613) 
-4.41%** 
(-2.456)
-3.85%** 
(-2.116)
-3.79%* 
(-1.979)
2 1.91% 
(1.343) 
1.69% 
(-0.934) 
0.04% 
(0.025) 
2.43% 
(1.265)  
3 -1.49%** 
(-1.98) 
-4.61%*** 
(-2.693) 
-3.59% 
(-1.994)** 
-1.49% 
(-0.782)  
4 2.09% 
(2.08) 
0.59% 
(0.338) 
1.00% 
(0.552) 
-0.07% 
(-0.040)  
5 -0.79% 
(-0.556) 
-4.64%*** 
(-2.697) 
-7.36%*** 
(-4.013) 
-7.85%*** 
(-4.081) 
6 -1.01% 
(-1.212) 
-2.23%* 
(-1.724) 
-0.95% 
(-0.513) 
1.90% 
(0.981)  
7 -1.21% 
(-1.568) 
0.98% 
(-0.548) 
-1.31% 
(-0.716) 
0.20% 
(0.109)  
8 1.66% 
(1.176) 
1.94% 
(-1.185) 
-3.61% 
(-1.973)* 
-4.58%** 
(-2.388)  
9 0.26% 
(0.184) 
-1.83% 
(-1.117) 
2.52% 
(1.378) 
-2.63% 
(-1.374)  
10 -0.93% 
(-0.632) 
-1.24% 
(-0.911) 
-0.35% 
(-0.183) 
1.66% 
(0.842)  
CAR -8.54%*** 
 (-6.93)  
-9.45%*** 
(-5.32) 
-8.77%*** 
(-9.28) 
-9.68%*** 
(-10.16) 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on p-value 
Source: Excel Output 
In the case of FNB, six days within the event window proved to render abnormal returns. One positive significant 
abnormal return occurred prior to the South African sovereign credit rating downgrade. Furthermore, FNB shares 
experienced a significant negative abnormal return of 2.11% on the day of the downgrade and four more significant 
negative abnormal returns succeeding the downgrade.  
The shares of Standard Bank were not subject to any significant abnormal returns prior to the South African sovereign 
credit rating downgrade or on the day of the downgrade. The shares of Standard Bank did, however, experience four 
significantly negative abnormal returns in the event window after the South African sovereign credit rating downgrade.  
The shares of ABSA were subject to two significant abnormal returns prior to the South African sovereign credit 
rating downgrade and three significant abnormal returns succeeding the downgrade. With the exception of the 
abnormal return occurring six days before the downgrade, which was positive, all the significant abnormal returns 
were negative.  
The cumulative abnormal returns were -14.54%, -9.45%, -12.77%, -9.68% for Nedbank, FNB, Standard Bank and 
ABSA respectively. All these cumulative abnormal returns are significant at a 99% confidence level. The study will 
now further the evidence on the impact of a South African sovereign credit rating on the shares of retail banks in South 
Africa by estimating a GARCH-BEKK model.  
3.2. VOLATILITY SPILLOVERS CAUSED BY A SOUTH AFRICAN SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATING 
DOWNGRADE 
The section will start with the necessary stationarity test results for the volatility spillover analysis. To establish a 
preliminary idea of whether the data used in this analysis is stationary and whether volatility clusters exist in each 
time series, the returns of each variable under consideration are plotted in Figure 1. None of these four graphs indicates 
that a trend exists in the returns of these banks. Furthermore, the change in the South African five-year CDS indicates 
that no trend exists. It is therefore expected that each series will be stationary and could therefore be used in volatility 
models. Secondly, there seem to be periods of high volatility and periods of low volatility, in other words, clusters of 
volatility in all five datasets. Formal tests will now be conducted to confirm the findings suggested by Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Returns for the South African banks 
 
 
Source: Eviews output 
 
3.2.1. AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER UNIT ROOT TEST 
Table 9 depicts the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results for each series included in the analysis. The returns of 
Nedbank, FNB, Standard Bank and ABSA are stationary at a 99% confidence level since the null hypothesis (series 
contains a unit root) can be rejected.  
Table 9: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results 
 Returns 
(Nedbank) 
Returns 
 (FNB) 
Returns (Standard 
Bank) 
Returns (ABSA) Change (CDS) 
P-value 0.009*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 
      
*, **, and *** denote significance level at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
Source: Eviews output 
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
R(NEDBANK)
-.20
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
R(FIRSTRAND)
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
R(STANDARDBANK)
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
R(ABSA)
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
R(SA_CDS)
Furthermore, the time series of the change in South Africa’s sovereign five-year CDS is also stationary at a 99% 
confidence level. As a result, these variables could be used in volatility models such as an ARCH model or a GARCH-
BEKK model. The results obtained by the univariate non-linear ARCH model will now be considered.  
3.2.2. TESTING FOR VOLATILITY CLUSTERS   
Table 10 displays the results of the heteroscedasticity ARCH model, conducted with the aim of determining whether 
each variable under analysis contains volatility clusters. It is clear that the null hypothesis, which is no ARCH effect 
or no volatility clusters, could be rejected at a 99% confidence level. Volatility clusters are therefore present in the 
returns of each South African retail bank under analysis and the change in the South Africa five- year CDS. The base 
model in each test is the return on each bank as dependent variable and the constant as an explanatory variable (Gujarati 
& Porter, 2009).  
Table 10: Volatility cluster test results 
 Returns 
(Nedbank) 
Returns (FNB) Returns (Standard 
Bank) 
Returns (ABSA) Change (CDS) 
ARCH-LM test p-
values 
0.001*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.009*** 
      
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
Source: Eviews output  
As suggested by Liu et al. (2017), given that all the variables in the analysis contain volatility clusters, the study could 
commence with the analysis that sets out to determine whether a South African sovereign credit rating downgrade 
caused volatility spillovers to the share returns of each bank under analysis.  
3.2.3. GARCH-BEKK ANALYSIS 
Considering the results in Table 11, as depicted by A’, the coefficient of conditional residual matrix, a South African 
sovereign credit rating change in the previous period had a significant spillover effect on the residual’s variance of 
Nedbank’s, FNB’s, Standard Bank’s and ABSA’s share returns. In other words, a South African sovereign credit 
rating change had a significant lagged impact on the ARCH parameter for each bank. Furthermore, B’, the coefficient 
of conditional covariance matrix, indicates that a South African sovereign credit rating change had a significant 
spillover effect on the GARCH parameter of each bank under analysis. This provides evidence that a South African 
sovereign credit rating change had a significant spillover effect on the volatility on the share returns of all four banks 
under analysis.  
Table 11: GARCH(1)-BEKK outputs 
Nedbank FNB Standard 
Bank 
ABSA 
A(1, .) 0.23*** 
(0.00) 
0.20*** 
(0.00) 
0.067** 
(0.01) 
0.11*** 
(0.00) 
B(1, .) 0.36*** 
(0.00) 
0.21** 
(0.03) 
0.11** 
(0.02) 
0.18** 
(0.01) 
C(1, .) -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
(0.72) (0.85) (0.63) (0.71) 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on p-value 
Note: A(1, i) and B(1, i) are corresponding ARCH and GARCH parameters of a sovereign credit rating downgrade 
for bank i. C(1, i) is a constant coefficient matrix.  
Source: Rats output 
Because the A’ and B’ coefficients indicate how the conditional variance depends on the squared and cross product 
of previous shocks in the South African credit rating proxy, Liu et al. (2017) and Mohammadi and Tan (2015) state 
that the A’ and B’ coefficients of each bank need to be squared. The reported coefficients are therefore squared 
coefficients. The response of Nedbank’s, FNB’s, Standard Bank’s and ABSA’s ARCH parameter to a one unit squared 
standardised innovation in the South African sovereign credit rating proxy series is 0.23, 0.20, 0.07 and 0.11 
respectively. Furthermore, the response of Nedbank’s, FNB’s, Standard Bank’s and ABSA’s GARCH parameter to a 
one unit squared standardised innovation in the South African sovereign credit rating proxy series is 0.36, 0.21, 0.11 
and 0.18 respectively. Liu et al. (2017) write that it should be noted that the coefficients of each matrix are difficult to 
interpret because the coefficient does not refer to a specific unit of analysis. It is therefore argued by Liu et al. (2017) 
that the significance of each matrix’s coefficient is the most important to consider and that significance indicates 
volatility spillovers. However, Liu et al. (2017) write that the value of each coefficient can be used to compare the 
relative magnitude of the volatility spillover effect of one variable to another. It is therefore shown that a South African 
sovereign credit rating change had the largest volatility spillover effect on Nedbank’s shares relative to the shares of 
the three other banks under analysis. T  
4. CONCLUSION  
Similar to the findings by Correa et al. (2014), Borensztein et al. (2013), Kim and Wu (2012), Brooks, Faff, Hillier 
and Hillier (2004) and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), this study found that a local sovereign credit rating 
downgrade generally had a negative impact on the shares of the local retail banking industry. South African sovereign 
credit rating downgrades resulted in significantly negative cumulated abnormal returns in the shares of all four banks 
under analysis, with the exception of the 13 June 2014 S&P South African sovereign credit rating downgrade that 
proved not to result in a significant cumulative abnormal return in the shares of ABSA. This means that relative to the 
rest of the market, shares of South African retail banks where particularly negatively impacted by a South African 
sovereign credit rating downgrade. Furthermore, the results obtained by the GARCH(1,1)-BEKK model provided 
evidence that a volatility spike in the South African sovereign credit rating proxy had a significant spillover effect on 
both the ARCH and GARCH parameters of each bank’s share prices. This indicates that a South African sovereign 
credit rating change did have a volatility spillover effect on the share price of the banks under analysis. Furthermore, 
despite the argument and evidence that show that the South African retail banks are well developed and more robust 
relative to typical retail banks in emerging markets, a South African credit rating change still had a significant spillover 
effect on the shares of these banks, and caused these shares to underperform relative to the market. 
This evidence indicates that investors should pay particular caution to shares of South African retail banks in periods 
where a downgrade might occur. Because shares of retail banks underperform relative to the rest of the market, 
investors should underweight these shares in their portfolio in times where a downgrade is expected, and overweigh 
these shares in times where an upgrade is expected. A systematic asset allocation adjustment by investors prior to a 
sovereign downgrade should result in a methodical decline in South African retail bank share prices, and thereby 
reduce any sudden volatility created by a downgrade because the downgrade was already priced in. As considered 
before, market volatility and panic in the banking sector can cause major liquidity problems for retail banks that can 
trigger system wide banking crises. An argument could be made that South African depositors are less likely to panic 
and demand their deposits if the share price of retail banks are fairly stable after a South African sovereign credit 
rating downgrade. Therefore, this study provides justification for investors in South African retail banks to price in an 
expected change in the South African credit rating by reducing their portfolio exposure to the retail banking industry. 
This will reduce the likelihood of panic on the day of a sovereign credit rating downgrade, which in turn reduces the 
risk of a system wide banking liquidity crisis that can potentially be triggered by such a downgrade.   
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Expected return during 2012 S&P sovereign credit rating downgrade 
 Standard &Poor (2012) downgrade 
Day Ned FNB Std Absa 
-10 0.85% -0.11% -0.14% -0.21% 
-9 -0.66% 0.09% 0.11% 0.16% 
-8 -0.70% 0.10% 0.12% 0.18% 
-7 0.20% -0.03% -0.03% -0.05% 
-6 0.93% -0.13% -0.16% -0.23% 
-5 -0.15% 0.02% 0.03% 0.04% 
-4 0.47% -0.06% -0.08% -0.12% 
-3 0.93% -0.13% -0.15% -0.23% 
-2 0.78% -0.11% -0.13% -0.20% 
-1 -0.57% 0.08% 0.10% 0.14% 
Day of downgrade -0.70% 0.09% 0.12% 0.17% 
1 0.48% -0.07% -0.08% -0.12% 
2 -0.75% 0.10% 0.13% 0.19% 
3 0.72% -0.10% -0.12% -0.18% 
4 0.11% -0.02% -0.02% -0.03% 
5 -0.32% 0.04% 0.05% 0.08% 
6 0.32% -0.04% -0.05% -0.08% 
7 0.40% -0.05% -0.07% -0.10% 
8 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% 
9 0.57% -0.08% -0.10% -0.14% 
10 0.74% -0.10% -0.12% -0.18% 
Source: Self constructed based on Excel outputs 
 
Table 2: Expected return during 2014 S&P sovereign credit rating downgrade 
 Standard &Poor (2014) downgrade 
Day Ned FNB Std Absa 
-10 0.40% 0.40% 0.30% 0.40% 
-9 1.60% 1.60% 1.60% 1.60% 
-8 -0.40% -0.40% -0.60% -0.40% 
-7 0.20% 0.30% 0.10% 0.20% 
-6 0.10% 0.10% -0.10% 0.10% 
-5 -0.20% -0.20% -0.40% -0.20% 
-4 0.30% -0.30% -0.50% 0.30% 
-3 0.00% 0.10% -0.10% 0.00% 
-2 -0.40% -0.30% -0.50% -0.40% 
-1 -1.50% -1.40% -1.70% -1.50% 
Day of downgrade 0.50% 0.60% 0.40% 0.50% 
1 0.40% 0.40% 0.30% 0.40% 
2 1.20% 1.30% 1.20% 1.20% 
3 0.00% 0.00% -0.20% 0.00% 
4 -0.30% -0.20% -0.40% -0.30% 
5 0.40% 0.40% 0.30% 0.40% 
6 0.80% 0.80% 0.70% 0.80% 
7 -0.60% -0.50% -0.70% -0.60% 
8 -0.60% -0.60% -0.80% -0.60% 
9 0.20% 0.30% 0.10% 0.20% 
10 0.80% 0.90% 0.80% 0.80% 
Source: Self constructed based on Excel outputs 
Table 3: Expected return during 2017 S&P sovereign credit rating downgrade 
 Standard &Poor (2017) downgrade 
Day Ned FNB Std Absa 
-10 0.46% 1.07% 0.93% 0.71% 
-9 1.35% 0.93% 0.79% 0.63% 
-8 0.90% 1.00% 0.86% 0.67% 
-7 -0.56% 1.22% 1.08% 0.79% 
-6 0.75% 1.02% 0.88% 0.68% 
-5 0.42% 1.07% 0.93% 0.71% 
-4 0.69% 1.03% 0.89% 0.69% 
-3 2.22% 0.80% 0.66% 0.56% 
-2 1.20% 0.95% 0.81% 0.64% 
-1 0.49% 1.06% 0.92% 0.71% 
Day of downgrade 0.44% 1.07% 0.93% 0.71% 
1 1.80% 0.86% 0.72% 0.59% 
2 1.35% 0.93% 0.79% 0.63% 
3 1.63% 0.89% 0.75% 0.61% 
4 0.74% 1.02% 0.88% 0.68% 
5 0.76% 1.02% 0.88% 0.68% 
6 1.53% 0.90% 0.76% 0.62% 
7 1.77% 0.87% 0.73% 0.60% 
8 0.94% 0.99% 0.85% 0.67% 
9 0.81% 1.01% 0.87% 0.68% 
10 0.90% 1.00% 0.86% 0.67% 
Source: Self constructed based on Excel outputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
